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This paper starts from the premise that political conflict in Western Europe has been fundamentally 
restructured since the 1970s in two consecutive waves of political change (see Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). 
Social movement scholars have paid close attention to mobilization by left-libertarian challengers as 
the driving forces of the first wave in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, studying the counter-
mobilization by the populist radical right (PRR) as the driving forces of the second wave is still mainly 
the business of electoral and party research (e.g., Caiani 2017: 11; Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 921; 
Rydgren 2007: 257). We think that this division not only reflects disciplinary boundaries, but more 
fundamentally, the nature of the collective actors in the two arenas. On the one hand, we suggest that, 
for both the challengers on the left and on the right, the choice of the political arena in which they 
express themselves is at the same time an expression of their underlying message. On the other hand, 
electoral studies and social movement studies tend to neglect the existence of different channels of 
mobilization. Both focus on a specific arena (either the electoral arena or the protest arena) and are thus 
half blind in their own way. Therefore, McAdam and Tarrow (2010; 2013) have again urged social 
movement scholars to overcome the ‘movement-centrism’ focus by examining the relation between 
electoral and movement politics. 
The present study attempts to bridge this disciplinary division in two ways. First, by 
systematically mapping the impact of the two waves of political change on the type of issues contested 
in both protest and electoral politics. Second, by focusing on the relationship between electoral and 
protest politics, and by arguing that the shift from left to right may be the source of the differing 
development paths in protest as compared to electoral politics. 
More specifically, we take up the claim that there might be different logics at work on the 
political left and the political right (Hutter 2014a; Hutter and Kriesi 2013). Challengers of the right 
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prefer the electoral channel and only refer to protest politics when they are not firmly established in the 
electoral arena. The left, in contrast, tends to promote its claims in both arenas at one and the same 
time. Thus, the left waxes and wanes at the same time in both arenas, while for the right, when its 
actors and issue positions become more salient in electoral politics, their salience decreases in protest 
politics. Overall, our results underline that the study of social movement should move both beyond a 
restricted focus on protest politics and beyond a “simple, positive relationship” (Meyer and Minkoff 
2004: 1484) between protest and its broader political context. Moreover, we add to this special issue on 
the far right as social movement (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro 2018) by shifting from organizations to 
broader cross-arena dynamics, by embedding the question of right-wing protest activities in a long-term 
perspective on political change, and by comparing challengers from the left with their competitors from 
the right. 
The contribution builds on previous reflections (Hutter 2014a) but thoroughly extends the 
empirical scope across time and space. In terms of time, we present new data on issue competition in 
electoral campaigns and protest events up to 2015. In terms of space, we complement the analysis of 
the long-term development in six Northwestern European (NWE) countries (Austria, Britain, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) with a larger set of 10 Western European countries for the 
years 2000 to 2015. This allows us to generalize previous findings and to see whether they still hold if 
we consider more recent developments and additional cases – most importantly, countries from 
Southern Europe with a traditionally stronger ‘old’ left and the emergence of massive anti-austerity 
protests in the wake of the Great Recession (e.g., Altiparmakis and Lorenzini 2018; della Porta 2015). 
The paper is structured as follows: At first, we summarize the arguments on the two-fold 
restructuration of conflict in Western Europe since the 1970s. We emphasize the shifts in both the 
driving forces of change and the main issues contested. Next, we introduce the two dominant 
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arguments on the relationship between electoral and protest politics in social movement research and 
elaborate our ‘different logics thesis.’ Thereafter, we introduce the data before presenting the results. 
The last section concludes and suggests potential avenues for further research. 
 
Restructuring political conflict in Western Europe: Driving forces and contested issues 
A wave of political change had swept through Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Scholars used 
different labels to name the divides at its core, such as the “new value” (Inglehart 1977) or “new class” 
(Kriesi 1989) divide. However, there is a consensus in the scholarly literature that the driving forces of 
political change were the so-called new social movements and left-libertarian parties that emerged in 
their wake (e.g., della Porta and Rucht 1991; Kitschelt 1988). The term ‘new’ underscores that these 
political forces were considered as breaking with the past and challenging the political order in Western 
Europe at that time.1 
The challenge posed was twofold. First, it arose from new issues and demands that these left-
libertarian actors tried to bring into the political process by providing a critical perspective on the side 
effects of modernization, and promoting environmental protection, individual autonomy, a free choice 
of lifestyle and other universalistic values. To cut a long story short, their mobilization triggered a 
                                                          
1 The label new overemphasizes certain features of these movements as compared to other social movements, especially the 
labor movement (e.g., differences in individual motivations, organizational structure, and action repertoires). For example, 
Tarrow (1989) argues that many authors who emphasize the ‘newness’ of the movements interpret an early phase of 
movement development as a new historical stage of collective action. Relatedly, Calhoun (1993) shows that many of the 
‘new’ features could also be observed for movements of the early 19th century. Nonetheless, we adhere in this paper to the 
label, because it remains widely used to designate the specific movement family that was responsible for a protest wave in 
Western Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Also, focusing on the goals of protest mobilization, we observe a 




transformation of the two-dimensional political spaces in Western Europe – traditionally constituted by 
a socio-economic (class) and a cultural (religion) dimension. The latter turned into an opposition 
between culturally libertarian views on the one hand and traditional authoritarian ones on the other 
(Kitschelt 1994). Thus, instead of adding a new dimension, the wave mainly transformed the meaning 
of the existing second dimension by embedding in it additional issues (particularly cultural liberalism 
and environment). Secondly, these actors also posed a challenge to the established system of interest 
intermediation as they sought more participatory modes of mobilization and engaged massively in 
protest activities to push their claims onto the agenda. 
Mobilization in the protest arena was instrumental to the restructuration of conflict and the 
emergence of new parties, most importantly, the Greens and other left-libertarian parties. At the same 
time, it triggered counter mobilization by conservative forces in both the streets and in parliament –
prominent examples of counter protests centered on abortion and LGTB rights (e.g., Ayoub 2016; King 
and Husting 2003). However, the new social movements and the related issue domains seemed to lose 
their strength in structuring protest politics as the mobilizing networks tended to institutionalize in the 
late 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Giugni and Passy 1999). 
Many astute observers of European politics shifted their attention to yet other political forces that 
entered the electoral arena in Western Europe during these years (e.g., Ignazi 1992). This time, the 
driving agents of change seemed to come from the political right. Populist radical right parties (PRR) 
are portrayed as the key driving forces of change since the 1990s. The rise of such parties made the 
headlines and led to a “minor industry” in party and electoral research during the last two decades 
(Arzheimer 2009: 259). Again, the new or transformed parties challenge the political order, both with 
respect to their political demands and the way they portray the democratic process. Their core 
ideological features – that is, nativism or ethno-nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism – 
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underscore the challenge (e.g., Bornschier 2010; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; van Kessel 2015). PRR 
parties insist on the primacy of the people over the elite and portray themselves as directly representing 
the popular will of the people. Thus, like the challengers from the left, the PRR also poses a challenge 
to established systems of interest intermediation. However, compared to the left-libertarian social 
movements, the challenge posed by the PRR seems more reflected in their negative portrayal of the 
democratic process and their proposed reforms than in the use of non-electoral forms of mobilization. 
Following the interpretation of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and Hooghe and Marks (2009, 2017), 
the rise of PRR parties is closely related to the emergence of another new divide since the 1990s. That 
is, the opening-up of national borders has led to the emergence of an “integration-demarcation” (Kriesi 
et al.) or “transnational” (Hooghe/Marks) cleavage because it intensified economic, cultural, and 
political competition across and within nation states. In this process, social divisions emerged between 
those parts of national societies that have gained in opportunities and resources and the ones that felt 
left behind and losing out. Thus, it is not by chance that the most contested issues in the wake of the 
second wave of political change are immigration and European integration. Conflicts over both issues 
underscore that the political significance of national boundaries tends to increase in moments when 
they are being weakened and reassessed. Both issues have had such a high potential to once again 
transform the structuration of political competition because the related oppositions do not neatly align 
with traditional economic left-right distinctions (e.g., van de Wardt et al. 2014). In fact, both tap into 
varying sources of conflict related sovereignty, solidarity, and identity in an ever more interdependent 
world (e.g., Hutter et al. 2016). Authority transfers to the European level and ethnic diversity are 
perceived as threats to distinctive cultural traditions and customs as well as to the economic well-being 
of certain strata of the national population (especially of the lower educated and those in unskilled 
manual professions).  
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Given the programmatic inflexibility of mainstream parties, the PRR parties have most 
effectively mobilized the anxieties of the losers of globalization by primarily claiming to defend 
national cultural identities and communities. In turn, the Eurosceptic and anti-immigration messages of 
these parties have led to yet another transformation of the political space in Western Europe. According 
to the results of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012), similarly to the transformative power of cultural liberal and 
environmental issues, European integration and immigration transformed the programmatic 
components of the second dimension and restructured the political space. Following Kriesi et al.’s 
approach, we label this second dimension and the issues embedded in it ‘cultural’ to denote the 
difference to the economic left-right divide between pro-market and pro-(welfare) state forces. 
However, it is important to note cross-country and -time variation in how much the two dimensions are 
aligned with each other and to what extent the strict separation between cultural and economic conflicts 
gets blurred even further.2 Illustrative examples for the latter dynamic offer conflicts over immigration 
and welfare. Some PRR parties – the French Front National being the prime example – have adopted 
more leftist economic policy positions in general and a programme of ‘welfare chauvinism’ in 
particular, i.e., they support generous welfare benefits for what they consider the ‘native’ population 
but advocate drastic restrictions for immigrants (e.g., Lefkofridi and Michel 2017). 
 
The relationship between protest and electoral politics 
As stated in the introductory section, the current scholarly literature offers more evidence on how the 
second wave has transformed electoral compared to protest politics. On the one hand, this is 
unsurprising given that the main driving actor, the PRR, has mainly taken the electoral channel while 
                                                          
2  On the link between economic and cultural preferences in public opinion, see Häusermann and Kriesi (2015). 
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protest politics seems to have become a reactive arena of counter mobilization. On the other hand, it is 
unsatisfactory because one cannot simply deduce the dynamics of conflict in one arena from the 
dynamics in another arena. 
In our quest to better understand the long-term dynamics of protest and electoral politics in 
Western Europe, we reconcile two opposing arguments from the political process approach in social 
movement research by introducing the strategic role played by political actors, i.e., by challengers from 
left and right. Both arguments share the crucial point of the political process approach that activities in 
institutionalized political arenas are decisive for the evolution and shape of social movements and 
protest politics. However, the two arguments tend to differ on how mobilization in the two arenas is 
related to each other. Somewhat simplified, the two strands in the literature differ in the direction of the 
systemic relationship between electoral and protest politics.3 
The dominant congruence argument postulates a positive correlation between protest and 
electoral politics. Proponents of the political process approach have suggested several underlying 
mechanisms (e.g., Tarrow 1998: 76ff.). Most importantly, controversy between established political 
actors is expected to increase the likelihood of protest mobilization. Divided elites, influential allies, 
and shifting political alignments – above all, a sense of electoral instability – constitute opportunities 
for political protest. In liberal democracies, these aspects are closely interwoven with electoral politics. 
                                                          
3 Following the main line of argument in the political process approach, the two arguments focus on explaining the 
development and differing shape of social movement activities over time and across contexts. Therefore, our 
conceptualization of the protest-election link in this paper follows a certain directional path from activities in electoral to 
protest politics, while not denying that protest mobilization can also trigger changes in electoral politics. However, 
following the political process approach, setting such a dynamic sequence in motion is more likely under certain conditions 
that are external to social movements. This differs to accounts that put the emphasis on (a) interactions between specific 
movements and parties and (b) conceptualize the relations rather from social movements to political parties, which are seen 
as “conveying belts” of movement messages (e.g., Korpi 1983). 
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Thus, if parties emphasize a certain issue or are divided over it, if an influential party ally supports a 
certain demand, or if electoral politics becomes increasingly volatile, the likelihood that the issue will 
give rise to protest politics increases. 
McAdam and Tarrow (2013) have further developed the argument by referring to substantive and 
psychological motives. In substantive terms, the authors emphasize that allies in the electoral arena 
offer institutional access and responsiveness which should encourage mobilization in the streets; in 
psychological terms, they point to the demoralizing effect of being on the political margins which 
should lead to demobilization instead. Therefore, McAdam and Tarrow (2013: 357) state that the 
congruent “waxing and waning of movement fortunes in connection with electoral alignments is 
exactly what the political process perspective would predict.”  
In contrast, the counterweight argument expects, that protest and electoral politics move in 
opposite directions. Piven and Cloward (1977: 15) are among the most forceful adherents of this view, 
stating that in liberal democracies “ordinarily, defiance is first expressed in the voting booth.” From 
their perspective, electoral politics is the first channel to measure emerging grievances, and people will 
resort to protest mobilization only if their changing voting patterns have no effect. Piven and Cloward 
(1977: 15) base their argument on the assertion that “people have been socialized within a political 
culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly 
occur.” Thus, issues which are already salient and controversial in electoral politics are less likely to 
become a main goal of action in the arena of protest politics. In their study of claims-making by the 
radical right, Giugni et al. (2005) find support for the negative relationship between party or extra-
parliamentary mobilization. Based on a spatial model of political behavior, they argue that the political 
space made available to certain claims in the protest arena inversely depends on the positions put 
forward by political parties in the more institutional arenas (see also Minkenberg 2003). 
10 
 
Reconsidering the two arguments, we have taken an intermediary position by arguing that the 
direction of the relationship depends on the ideological orientation of the actors and claims under 
scrutiny (Hutter 2014a; Hutter and Kriesi 2013). That is, challengers from the left are expected to 
follow a different logic than challengers from the right when it comes to their involvement in electoral 
and protest politics. For the political left, it is expected that the more salient the claims they put forward 
become in the electoral arena, the more salient these claims become in the protest arena as well. For the 
political right, the opposite tends to hold: the more salient their claims in electoral politics, the less 
often they should give rise to protest mobilization. In other words, the two systemic arguments 
introduced so far neglect the strategic considerations of political actors which, as we argue here, might 
be shaped by their ideological background. 
In a nutshell, we argue that the differences between left and right in Western Europe mirror past 
alliances and the legacy of the left-libertarian mobilization efforts while being ultimately rooted in 
differing value orientations of leaders and adherents (for a more detailed discussion, see Hutter 2014a: 
25ff.). While rebels on the right tend to have authoritarian and materialist values and prefer (orderly) 
conventional political action over (disorderly) protest politics, rebels on the left tend to share libertarian 
and postmaterialist values, which predispose them towards unconventional protest politics (e.g., 
Flanagan and Lee 2003; Torcal et al. 2016). Thus, for both challengers from the left and from the right, 
the ‘medium is the message’, i.e., the choice of the preferred channel in which they express themselves 
seems to also be an expression of their underlying messages. These differences underscore the 
“political paradox of the populist right” (Taggart 2002) which tends to be highly critical of 
representative democracy but mainly relies on the electoral channel and party organizations for its 
mobilization. The paradox reflects the underlying value orientations of its adherents and seems part of a 
strategy of ‘double differentiation.’ That is, PRR leaders and followers try to set themselves not only 
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apart from their adversaries on the left, who are viewed as “chaotic” protesters, but also from the 
extreme and neo-fascist right (see Minkenberg 2003). 
Taken together, the review of the literature leads us to the following guiding expectations: 
First, we expect a two-fold restructuration in protest politics, reflecting a temporal sequence from 
cultural liberalism and environment (the key issues associated with the left-libertarian wave) to 
immigration and European integration (the key issues associated with the right-populist wave). 
However, given the differing driving forces of change, we expect that the second wave left less 
pronounced marks on protest politics than the first wave (cross-wave expectation). 
Second, we expect the same two-fold restructuration of conflict in electoral politics. However, the 
rise of PRR parties and their claims should be much more pronounced than in protest politics which 
mainly remains the terrain to counter the populist right’s rise in electoral politics (cross-arena 
expectation). 
Finally, we expect cross-national variation in protest politics depending on the strength of the 
new challengers in the electoral arena: the stronger the new challengers in electoral terms, the more the 
new ‘cultural’ issues should structure protest politics as well; however, the stronger the populist-right 
challengers in electoral terms, the less likely related positions on these new ‘cultural’ issues should 
become in protest politics (cross-country expectations). 
 
Design and methods 
Given the scarcity of comparative and long-term data on the contested issues in protest politics, we 
tend to know more on how the two waves transformed the electoral arena. Therefore, in this 
contribution we emphasis the way protest politics has developed and how that differs from the 
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development of the electoral arena. Methodologically, we mainly draw on protest event analysis (PEA), 
a form of quantitative content analysis of mostly media sources, aimed at cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analyses of protest events.  
We rely on two protest event datasets. The first is an updated and extended version of the data 
used by Kriesi et al. (1995) (PEA-6 in Table 1). The data is based on the coding of the Monday editions 
of one leading quality newspaper.4 Except for France, we updated the data so that it covers 1975 to 
2011 for six Northwestern European (NWE) countries (Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland).5 The coding process resulted in a data set of 19,740 protest events 
involved an estimated number of around 131 million participants.6 The dataset allows us to trace the 
long-term trends in the six countries. Due to the detailed coding of the issues, we can differentiate 
protests related to the four new ‘cultural’ issues: (a) environmental protection (including nuclear 
energy), (b) cultural liberalism (which covers other main issues of the new social movements, such as 
international peace, women’s or LGTB rights, solidarity expressed with developing countries, and free 
spaces for alternative lifestyles), (c) immigration (covering protests by, against and on behalf of 
migrants), and (d) European integration defined as constitutive European issues pertaining to questions 
of ‘membership’, ‘competences’ and ‘decision-making rules.’ As stated in the theory section, we adopt 
Kriesi et al.’s (2008, 2012) labeling of the issues as ‘cultural’ because they are predominantly 
embedded in the second dimension of the political space. However, this does by no means suggest that 
the conflicts over these issues are unrelated to economic preferences and arguments. 
                                                          
4 The sources are Die Presse (Austria), The Guardian (Britain), Le Monde (France), Frankfurter Rundschau (Germany), 
NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands), and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland). 
5 In previous work, we have only presented data up to 2005 (Hutter 2014a). 
6 Where numbers of participants are missing, they have been replaced by the national median of the number of participants 
for a given type of event (e.g., a demonstration) in that country. 
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The second PEA dataset was collected with semi-automated content analysis by the ERC project 
Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON) at the European 
University Institute and the Years of Turmoil (YoT) project at the University of Zurich (PEA-16 in 
Table 1). It is based on the coverage of 10 English language newswires (for details, see Kriesi et al. 
2018 and Appendix A2). In general, the data covers protests in 30 European countries in a period of 
sixteen years (2000-2015). Given the Western European focus of the present paper, we rely on this 
dataset to generalize our argument from the previous six countries to another set of 10 Northwestern 
and Southern European countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). The part of the data we consider covers an overall number of 8,935 
protest events which involved around 70 million participants. Due to the semi-automated collection and 
the different research question of the project, the issue categories provided by this dataset are less 
detailed. They allow us to analyze the combined share of the new ‘cultural’ protests, however it does 




PEA is one of the major methodological advances in social movement research, and it has also 
triggered a lively and controversial methodological debate (for overviews, see Hutter 2014b; 
Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Importantly, the methodological reflections have highlighted that (a) only 
a small fraction of protests is covered by media sources (international sources tend to be much more 
selective than national and especially regional or local sources) and (b) there are specific factors 
predicting whether news media cover an event or not. Earl et al. (2004: 69ff.) sum up the literature by 
pointing to three sets of factors: event characteristics (e.g., size, violence), news agency characteristics 
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(e.g., political or local orientation of the newspaper), and issue characteristics (e.g., media attention 
cycles). No one claims that there is no such selection bias, but scholarly controversies continue over 
how severe and, in particular, how systematic these biases are across contexts and over time (see the 
opposing reviews by Earl et al. 2004 and Ortiz et al. 2005). The question of ‘how systematic’ is most 
important for our cross-temporal and cross-country analysis.  
In previous work, we invested into evaluating the severity of the bias of Kriesi et al.’s (1995 
‘minimalist’ sampling strategy which has been criticized for increasing the general selection bias of 
newspaper data (for details, see Hutter 2014a: 147ff.). In Appendix A1, we present some of the tests. 
Most importantly, the tests and other studies (e.g., McCarthy et al. 2008) suggest that the factors 
affecting coverage rates are more stable than often expected (at least within a single newspaper, for 
national sources, and if we adopt an aggregation in broad issue areas and over extended periods of 
time). Appendix A2 presents more details on the data collection and first validations for the new semi-
automated PEA-16 data (for details, see Wüest and Lorenzini 2018). Again, the discussion points to the 
strong selectivity in the reporting of newswires. Given the higher selectivity of international sources 
and the sampling strategy of the project, the average number of coded events per year and country is 
lower than for the PEA-6 dataset. Therefore, we opt for a high level of aggregation of both issues and 
time to avoid over-interpreting the data, and we only study the cross-national variation in the PEA-16 
data based on aggregate figures for all sixteen years. We also checked the results from both datasets for 
country outliers given that we are in this paper most interested in general dynamics across Western 
Europe. In addition, relying on two differently collected datasets allowed us to cross-check our findings 
on the most salient issues and positions in protest politics in the 2000s. These cautionary measures in 
the data analysis cannot overcome problems of selection bias. However, we side with Earl et al. (2004: 
76f.) who have argued that while being imperfect, the best available protest event data for cross-
national comparisons are still worthy of analysis. 
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 For the cross-arena comparisons, we draw on electoral results and manually coded data on 
election campaigns. The electoral results for Green parties (as the main family associated with the left-
libertarian wave) and PRR parties in the 16 countries are based on the ParlGov dataset (Döring and 
Manow 2016).7 The data on issue competition in electoral politics were collected by Kriesi et al. (2008, 
2012) and updated for the years 2007 to 2015 by the POLCON project. It is based on the coverage of 
two newspapers per country (one quality newspaper and one tabloid) during the two months before the 
elections (see the sources in the Appendix A3). Parties’ issue positions and salience were coded using 
core sentence analysis (CSA) (for details, see Kriesi et al. 2008: Chapter 3). Given our long-term focus, 
we draw here on the data for the six NWE countries which include a reference campaign from the 
1970s and all election campaigns from the early 1990s to 2015. Importantly, we focus here on 
statements related to the new ‘cultural’ issues by all parties. This considers the fact that over time the 
mainstream parties have adopted the issues and (in part) the positions advocated by the new 
challengers. A clear example is the transformation of social democratic parties which adopted the 
positions of Green and other small left-libertarian parties on the new ‘cultural’ issues to appeal to their 




To begin, we study the way the expected two-fold transformation of political conflict has restructured 
protest politics in the six NWE countries from the mid-1970s to 2011. Based on the PEA-6 data, we 
                                                          
7 For the purposes of this indicator, we rely on the party classification in the ParlGov dataset, with minor exceptions. We 
classify the following two parties as part of the PRR family: Party for Freedom (NL), Swiss People's Party (CH; after its 
transformation in the late 1980s). 
16 
 
consider (a) the overall mobilization levels (in terms of events and participants) related to the new 
‘cultural’ issues (Figure 1) and (b) their salience and polarization scores (Figure 2). The mobilization 
levels are measured by the average numbers of coded events and involved participants; the latter are 




Figure 1 indicates that, on average, the six countries saw the most clear-cut protest wave related 
to the new ‘cultural’ issues in the early 1980s. This is to confirm much empirical evidence for a wave 
related to the new social movements in many Western European countries in the early 1980s (e.g., 
Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994). As is well known, major protests at the time opposed the stationing of 
Cruise missiles in Europe, nuclear energy and other infrastructural projects. Most importantly for the 
present argument, Figure 1 points to further peaks in protest mobilization during both the early 1990s 
and the early 2000s. These later peaks tend to be less pronounced than the one in the early 1980s (as 
indicated by the lower moving averages for events and the much lower number of involved 
participants). Regarding participation, the early 1990s and 2003 stand out. The events that attracted 
most participants in the early 1990s centered around xenophobia, environmental protection but also 
around the First Iraq War, while the peak in 2003 is mainly caused by the European-wide protests 
against the Second Iraq War. The trends since 2006 – which are based on five countries only8 – point to 
                                                          
8 As stated before, the PEA-6 data have been updated for the years 2006 to 2011 for all countries except France. Appendix 
A4 shows the Figures 1 and 2 excluding France for the whole period. Note that the general interpretations are not affected 




no major remobilization, although the year 2011 saw some large-scale protest events. Most 
importantly, the nuclear incident in Fukushima triggered a revival of anti-nuclear protests. 
Moving beyond single events, we take a more systematic look at the main issues being contested 
in protest politics in Figure 2. The graphs on the left plot the average shares of protest events and 
participants related to the two issue domains in percent of all coded protests on any type of issue. These 
measures allow us to talk about the relative importance of the two domains and they resemble 




Overall, the findings in Figure 2 highlight the importance of the two sets of issues which account 
for more than 60 percent of all coded events. At the same time, the trends across the six NWE countries 
support and simultaneously moderate the claim that the second wave of political change affected 
protest politics as well. On the one hand, we observe a rising salience of immigration and Europe (the 
key issues associated with the populist-right wave) since the mid-1980s. The yearly event shares for the 
two issues stabilize on a level of around 20 to 30 percent from the 1990s onwards. Note that a more 
detailed look at the data confirms previous findings as European integration is still a rather minor issue 
in the protest arena (e.g., Imig and Tarrow 2000). Thus, the trends shown in Figure 2 are mainly due to 
increasing shares of immigration-related protests. 
On the other hand, the participation figures and the comparison with cultural liberalism and 
environmental protection put this into perspective. Figure 2 shows peaks in the number of people 
involved in immigration-related protests in the early 1990s, i.e., during a period of heightened protest 
mobilization (again, see Figure 1). However, cultural liberalism and environmental protection (as the 
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key issues associated with the left-libertarian wave) still dominate the protest arena, not least by 
mobilizing much larger shares of participants than immigration-related protests. This also holds for the 
most recent period after 2005. 
The average positions shown on the right in Figure 2 highlight yet other key features of the issue 
contestation in protest politics. Protests related to both issue domains are largely supporting libertarian 
or integrationist positions as indicated by the positive average values. As the somewhat lower values 
for immigration and Europe suggest, counter mobilization against the dominant ‘left-libertarian’ 
positions is mainly restricted to anti-immigration protests which demand more restrictive immigration 
and integration policies and often advocate xenophobic or racist demands. Interestingly, the lower 
moving averages for immigration since the mid-1980s highlight that the increasing salience of 
immigration protests came with a certain polarization of the claims put forward. That is, the rise of 
immigration as a salient issue in the protest arena is due to both increasing mobilization by opponents 
and supporters. Nonetheless, the average positions of a little below 0.4 still indicate that more than two-
thirds of all coded protests advocate for migrants’ rights and anti-racism. At least in relative terms, 
counter mobilization to cultural liberalism has always been much less important in Western European 
protest arenas. Thus, apart from important exceptions like the recent marches against same-sex 
marriage, the data suggest that the protest arena has been dominated by events in favor of a further 
liberalization throughout the research period.   
 
Cross-arena comparison 
Before zooming-in on the cross-national variation in how much the new ‘cultural’ issues restructured 
protest politics, let us first compare the general long-term developments in NWE across the two arenas. 
To do so, we present the vote shares of the main party families associated with the two waves, i.e., 
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Green and PRR parties, as well as the issue salience and positions in electoral politics from the 1970s 
up to 2015 (Figure 3). 
While one should not overstate the electoral relevance of both party families across the six 
countries under scrutiny, the trend lines9 in Figure 3 show the increasing electoral gains since the 
1980s. For the cross-arena story, it is significant to note that comparing the pattern with the trends 
presented so far highlights that the rise of the Greens comes after the protest wave in the early 1980s, 
while the PRR parties started to gain votes before or rather in congruence with later peaks in protest 
mobilization and rising protests over immigration. However, most important seems to be that the 
average vote share of the PRR across the six countries is much higher than the vote share of the Greens. 
We also see an acceleration of the long-term trends in the vote share of challenger parties. The averages 
for both party families are higher in the years 2010 to 2015 than in any previous decades: 6.9 percent 




The focus on the contested issues in electoral politics highlights that cultural liberalism and 
environmental protection figured already prominently in the reference campaigns of the 1970s (again, 
                                                          
9 The trend lines are based on locally weighted smoothing (LOWESS). 
10 The overall patterns are very similar if we consider a larger set of 20 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Britain, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). However, the main difference is the later and less pronounced increase in the 
vote share of the PRR parties. For the PRR, the early rise in the late 1980s and the higher overall level across the six 
countries shown in Figure 3 is very much driven by the programmatic transformation and strength of the conservative-
liberal Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the agrarian Swiss People’s Party (SVP). 
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see Figure 3). That is, we observe salient conflicts over these issues already before the electoral 
breakthrough of Green parties as key representatives of the new left-libertarian forces in the electoral 
arena. This finding is supported by the mean salience scores per decade which range from a maximum 
of 20.9 percent in the 1970s to a minimum of 19.0 percent in the years 2000 to 2009 (countries 
weighted equally). Similarly, we do not observe a strong general trend in the average position towards 
cultural liberalism and environment. The respective trend line in the graph on the right in Figure 3 is a 
bit above 0, indicating a rather balanced distribution of pro- and anti-statements. A more detailed 
analysis highlights the shift of social democrats towards the articulation of similar positions on these 
issues as Green and other small left-libertarian parties.11 
Figure 3 also highlights the increasingly salient conflicts over immigration and European 
integration in the electoral arena of the six countries. The topics were almost ‘non-issues’ in the 1970s 
with an average salience of below 5 percent, whereas they account for an average of 15.7 percent of all 
coded party statements in the years 2010 to 2015. While the average positions shown in Figure 3 are 
based on few observations for the 1970s only, the results tend to indicate that increasing salience also 
came with a slight downward trend towards more anti-immigration and Eurosceptic party positions. 
However, note again that the average positions in the electoral arena are close to 0 which indicates a 
rather even balance between positive and negative statements on immigration and European 
integration. The new challenger parties from both left and right overemphasize immigration and 
European integration. However, in absolute terms, most of the statements shown in Figure 3 are due to 
mainstream parties increasingly addressing these issues.12 
                                                          
11 Results available from authors. 
12 Results available from the authors. 
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For the cross-arena comparison, it is important to highlight that, first, the combined salience of 
the new ‘cultural’ issues is higher in protest than in electoral politics. This underlines that protest 
politics in NWE has become the terrain for conflicts over cultural and not economic issues. Second, as 
expected, the rise of the PRR and their related claims are much weaker in protest politics. That is, we 
observe by far less right-wing claims than in electoral politics, and protest politics tends to be still more 
structured by conflicts over cultural liberalism and the environment than by conflicts over immigration. 




So far, we have adopted a regional perspective and traced the long-term developments across 
Northwestern Europe. In this last section of the analysis, we take advantage of the second PEA dataset 
(PEA-16) which allows us to examine the cross-national variation of 16 Western European countries. 
First, we aim to see whether the dominance of the new ‘cultural’ issues holds for a larger set of 
Western European countries. Second, and most importantly, the data allows us to further investigate the 
expected relationship between the rise new challengers and issues in electoral and protest politics. 
Figure 4 shows the salience and average positions in three groups of countries: the six cases 
analyzed so far, a group of an additional five NWE countries (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Norway, and Sweden) and five Southern European countries (i.e., Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal). As stated in the introduction, the inclusion of Southern Europe seems most important 
because of a stronger ‘old’ leftist tradition and because this group of countries has been particularly 






First, the findings for the original six NWE countries support the conclusions on the salience of 
the new ‘cultural’ issues drawn based on the previous dataset. As the trends in Figure 4 show, protest 
politics in these countries is very much structured by these issues. They account for around 50 to 60 
percent of all coded protest events and involved participants. This finding also holds for the most recent 
years after the onset of the Great Recession in fall 2008. Second, we observe a very similar pattern in 
the other Northwestern European countries; although there the relative shares of events and participants 
related to the new ‘cultural’ issues declined over time.13 Third, we can conclude that the protest arena 
in Southern Europe is still more structured by other types of conflicts, and these cross-regional 
differences within Western Europe have been reinforced during the recent economic crisis (for more 
details, see Kriesi et al. 2018). 
Although the average salience of the new ‘cultural issues’ differs across the three groups of 
countries, we observe the same kind of ‘left-libertarian’ bias regarding the positions advocated for in 
the protest arena. The moving averages are declining after the mid-2000s which hints at a stronger 
counter mobilization. Nevertheless, the values of around 0.5 indicate that only about 25 percent of all 
protests advocate similar positions as the ones emphasized by the PPR parties in electoral politics. 
Once again, this finding indicates strong cross-arena differences in how the conflicts over the new 
‘cultural’ issues are articulated in protest as compared to electoral politics. 
Let us now focus on whether we observe systematic variation across the sixteen countries. To 
repeat, we expect a positive relationship between the overall strength of challenger parties from both 
                                                          
13 The trend is partly triggered by more economic protests in Belgium and Ireland, both harder hit by the economic crisis 
than most other countries in NWE which recovered quickly after the initial ‘shock period’ in 2009 - 2010.  
23 
 
left and right in the electoral arena and the share of new ‘cultural events’ in the protest arena. However, 
following the idea that the political left and right differ in their strategic calculations, we postulate a 
negative relationship between the strength of PRR parties in the electoral arena and related positions (in 
particular, anti-immigration positions) in the protest arena. To examine these expectations across a 
larger set of Western European countries, we aggregate the PEA-16 dataset on the country level. First, 
we calculated the share of protests on new ‘cultural’ issues relative to all protest events. Second, we 
calculated the average position promoted by these protests in each country (again positive values 
indicated support for cultural liberalism, environment, immigration, and European integration). In 
addition, we calculated the average vote share of PRR and Green parties across all elections during the 
period covered by our PEA-16 dataset (i.e., from 2000 to 2015). We use the vote share as a proxy for 
the strength of the two-fold transformation in the electoral arena.14 
Figure 5a shows the average vote jointly received by Green and PRR parties, as well as the share 
of protests on new ‘cultural’ issues in percent of all coded protests. As the figure shows, across 
Western Europe there is a strong positive correlation: countries where the new challengers are 
electorally stronger have tended to experience more protests related to cultural liberalism, environment, 
immigration, and Europe. Pearson’s r for the simple linear trend is 0.58. We get very similar results if 
we focus on the vote share of the two party families separately. The correlation with the Green vote 
share is only slightly higher than with the PRR vote share (Pearson’s r=0.55 and 0.48, respectively). As 
the figure shows, the Southern European countries (represented with triangles in Figure 5) stand for one 
side of the equation: Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy saw the least share of protests on new 
‘cultural’ issues, and in these countries PRR and Green parties tend to be rather unsuccessful in 
                                                          
14 We cross-checked the results by including in the measure, the vote shares of those Social Democratic parties that adopted 
essentially the same positions on the new ‘cultural’ issues as the Green parties (we based the classification on the positions 
included in the ParlGov dataset). The conclusions are not affected by this decision. 
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electoral terms. By contrast, in countries like Austria, Denmark, or Norway, challenger parties are 
much stronger in the electoral arena and we observe a large share of the new ‘cultural’ issues in the 




But how are the rise of the PPR in electoral politics and the average positions advocated in 
protest politics related to each other? As argued before, we expect that new ‘cultural issues’ are 
structuring protest politics more in countries where we also observe strong new challengers in the 
electoral arena. However, the stronger the PPR in electoral terms, the more we expect the protest arena 
to be dominated by voices that counter the PPR’s positions. In Figure 5b we present the vote share of 
the PRR and the average positions on the new ‘cultural’ issues in the protest arena. As the figure 
shows, with some important outliers, there is a negative relationship: in countries where the PRR is 
electorally strong, the counter forces from the left tend to dominant protest politics (Pearson’s r=-0.34). 
Countries like Austria, Belgium, or the Netherlands are illustrative of this phenomenon: with a strong 
PRR in parliament, they are more likely to experience a strong dominance of left-libertarian 
mobilization in protests over new ‘cultural’ issues.15 
 
Conclusions 
                                                          
15 The Southern European countries deviate most from the expectation with rather weak PRR parties but with relatively 
‘leftist’ protests over cultural issues. In turn, the correlation coefficient increases somewhat once we exclude them from the 
calculation (Pearson’s R=-0.44). 
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This paper started with the premise that West European politics has been the object of two major 
transformations since the 1970s. While social movement scholars have paid close attention to the first 
transformation driven by left-libertarian forces in the 1970s/early 1980s, they have less systematically 
dealt with the second one driven by populist radical right challengers since the 1990s. As we argued, 
this uneven attention reflects both the kind of collective actors driving the two waves (i.e., challengers 
of the left and challengers of the right, respectively) and disciplinary boundaries. We tried to bridge this 
division by highlighting that the two-fold transformation left different marks on the two arenas of 
politics, and by arguing that the shift from left to right may be the source of the differing 
developmental paths. 
To do so, we described the issues being contested in the two arenas and the relative strength of 
challengers from the right and the left across waves, arenas, and countries. Methodologically, we relied 
on two original protest event datasets and supplemented them with data on electoral results and election 
campaigns. Our empirical analysis offers four central findings:  
First, we find the two-fold restructuration of conflict in protest politics. There are several peaks 
in the level of mobilization related to the new ‘cultural’ issues and we observe a temporal sequence 
from cultural liberalism and environment to immigration. However, the shift is not as strong because 
cultural liberalism and environmental protection still dominate the protest arena. Moreover, the rise of 
immigration as a contested issue has been related to a certain return of right-wing positions to protest 
politics in Northwestern Europe. Second, the cross-arena comparison indicates that electoral politics 
has also been restructured by both waves, but there the rise of the populist radical right and its claims 
has been much more pronounced than in the protest arena. The latter remains the terrain of left-
libertarian positions in general and protests by and on behalf of migrants still far outweigh protests 
opposing them. Third, the cross-national comparison shows that the rise of what we called new 
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‘cultural’ issues in protest politics is much more pronounced in Northwestern Europe than in Southern 
Europe. These cross-national difference mirror similar differences in the strength of Green and PRR 
parties and they have also been reinforced during the most recent economic crisis.  Finally, the broader 
country sample confirms previous results on the differing cross-arena dynamics on the political left and 
the political right. That is, we observe a positive correlation between the salience of new ‘cultural 
issues’ in protest politics and the electoral strength of new challenger parties. However, if we focus on 
the positions promoted by these protests, we find that the more successful the populist radical right is in 
electoral terms, the less its related positions are promoted by protest activities. 
In this contribution, we adopted a bird’s-eye approach on the long-term dynamics in protest and 
electoral politics. This allowed us to uncover broader patterns of how challengers from the left and the 
right differently approach and combine mobilization in these two arenas of mass politics. Our approach 
complements the other contributions in the special issue which focus on specific cases and 
organizations. Such an analysis that trace the action repertoire and strategic decisions of single 
organizations are needed to further examine the implications of the claims that we empirically describe 
at an aggregate level of analysis. Here, future research could profit from selecting political parties or 
social movements during different stages of their life cycle to uncover the role of strategic 
considerations and value orientations of leaders and voters. For the latter, it could also be worth testing 
in a more experimental setting under what conditions adherents of left-libertarian and populist-radical 
right organizations and parties might be willing to take it to the streets of Western Europe. Finally, our 
preliminary results indicate the heuristic value of looking at European macro regions. A next step could 
be to extend our results to Central and Eastern Europe to understand how the socio-economic and 
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Figures and tables 
 
Table 1: Datasets used for the analysis of the contested issues in protest and electoral politics 
Name Arena Geographical coverage Temporal coverage Source 
PEA-6 Protest arena AT, FR, DE, NL, CH, UK 1975-2011 
(in FR: 1975-2005) 
National newspapers 
PEA-16 Protest arena AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FR, 
GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, SE, UK 
2000-2015 English-language 
news agencies 





Figure 1: Level of protest mobilization related to new ‘cultural’ issues in NWE, 1975 to 2011 (N=6) 
 
Note: The figure shows the average number of coded protest events and participants related to new ‘cultural’ 
issues in the six NWE countries by year (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) 
(countries weighted equally). The participation rate indicates the number of reported participants per million 
inhabitants (in 1,000s). The graphs show three-year moving averages (for yearly values, see Appendix A4). 
Data source: PEA-6 
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Figure 2: Issue salience and positions in protest politics in NWE, 1975 to 2011 (N=6) 
 
Note: The figure shows the average salience and positions for the two sets of cultural issues in the six NWE 
countries by year (countries weighted equally). Salience indicates the share of events/participants in percentage 
of all events/participants. The average position is calculated as the mean of all coded events related to the two 
sets of issues (range -1 to 1). Positive values indicate support for cultural liberalism/environmental protection 
and for immigration/European integration. The graphs show three-year moving averages (for yearly values, see 
Appendix A4). 
 
Data source: PEA-6  
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Figure 3: The developments in electoral politics in NWE, 1970 to 2015 (N=6) 
 
Note: The graph on the left shows the vote share of Green parties and populist radical right parties in the six 
NWE countries by election. The other two graphs show the average salience and positions for the two sets of 
cultural issues by election. Salience indicates the share of actor-issue statements related to the two sets of issues 
in percent of all coded actor-issue sentences. The average position is calculated as the mean of all actor-issue 
statements on the two issues (range -1 to 1). Positive statements indicate support for cultural 
liberalism/environment and for immigration/European integration. The trend lines are based on locally weighted 
smoothing (LOWESS). 




Figure 4: Issue salience and positions in protest politics across regions, 2000 to 2015 (N=16) 
 
Note: The figure shows the average salience and positions for the new ‘cultural’ issues by region and year. The 
indicators are the same as in Figure 2. However, given the different issue categories provided by the dataset, we 
only show the combined values for the two sets of cultural issues. The graphs show three-year moving averages 
(for the yearly values, see Appendix A4). 
Data source: PEA-16  
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Figure 5: Electoral strength of challenger parties and protest politics in 16 Western European countries 
 
Note: Figure 5a shows the average vote share jointly received by Green and PRR parties and the share of protest 
events related to new ‘cultural’ issues in percent of all coded protests. Figure 5b shows the average vote share 
received by PPR parties only and the average position on new ‘cultural’ events in the protest arena (range -1 to 1). 
To show the strength of PRR claims, positive values indicate support for cultural conservatism/xenophobia. 
The figures show the average values for the period 2000 to 2015 (party classifications based on ParlGov dataset). 
The line shows the regression line across all countries (Pearson’s r = 0.58 for Figure 5a and -0.34 for Figure 5b). 
 




Appendix A1: The manual protest event dataset (PEA-6) 
The first protest event dataset is an updated and extended version of the data used by Kriesi et al. 
(1995) to study new social movements in four West European countries (France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland) from 1975 to 1989. We rely on data for six countries and the years 1975 
to 2005 (for France) and to 2011 (for Austria, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). 
The data is based on the coding of the Monday editions of one leading quality newspaper per 
country. As stated in the main text, the sources are Die Presse (Austria), The Guardian (Britain), Le 
Monde (France), Frankfurter Rundschau (Germany), NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands), and Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland). The choice of Monday editions was dictated not only by the necessity 
to reduce the work of collecting a large number of events over a long period of time, but because the 
Monday edition reports on events during the weekend. Since protests tend to be concentrated on the 
weekend, our data includes a high proportion of all events occurring during the period under study. We 
coded all events noted in the Monday edition, including those taking place one week before or after the 
publication date. That is why around 25 percent of all coded events occurred during weekdays. 
PEA generally, and Kriesi et al.’s sampling strategy more specifically, have been the objects of 
criticism in the literature and researchers still disagree on how bad the selection bias of newspaper data 
is (see the opposing reviews of Earl et al. (2004) and Ortiz et al. (2005)). As we cannot provide a 
detailed summary and empirical assessment here, we only (a) introduce the main factors that affect 
coverage rates, (b) discuss the results on the stability and cross-national comparability in the patterns of 
selection bias, and (c) show how we account for the limits of the ‘minimalist’ strategy of data 
collection in our analysis (for more details, see Hutter 2014a: 147ff.) 
According to the police, more than a thousand demonstrations take place in a city like Paris every 
year, but only a fraction of them make the national news (and are ultimately included in our dataset).  
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No one would claim that the covered events are a representative sample of all protest events, but the 
main factors that predict whether news media cover an event or not have been empirically assessed. As 
stated, Earl et al. (2004: 69ff.) sum up the literature by pointing to three sets of factors: event 
characteristics (e.g., size, violence), news agency characteristics (e.g., political or local orientation of 
the newspaper), and issue characteristics (e.g., media attention cycles). Regarding event characteristics, 
Rucht and Neidhardt (1998: 76) even state, “In the case of very large events, as in cases of violent 
demonstrations leading to significant damage to property and/or injuries, we can expect a total 
coverage even when using only one national newspaper.”1 Furthermore, many studies have shown that 
local newspapers are less selective than national newspaper and left-wing newspapers less selective 
than right-wing or conservative newspapers (e.g., Hocke, 2002; Koopmans, 1995; Oliver and Myers, 
1999; Swank, 2000). Moreover, protests that resonate with more general concerns tend to be more 
likely to be reported—this is what McCarthy et al. (1996) call the “media attention cycle.” 
Unfortunately, we cannot avoid these biases but as Koopmans (1995: 271) notes, “Given the fact 
that trends and differences are usually more interesting than precise levels, one should try to make the 
bias as systematic as possible.” Thus, it is important for the present study whether the biases are 
consistent over time and across countries. Though studies find inconsistent patterns across short periods 
of a week or a month (e.g., Myers and Schaefer Caniglia, 2004; Oliver and Maney, 2000; Swank, 
2000), others show that the patterns of selection bias tend to be fairly stable over time (e.g., Barranco 
and Wisler, 1999; McCarthy et al., 1996; McCarthy et al., 2008). This holds especially within 
individual newspapers, for national sources, and over broader issue areas and longer periods of time 
(that is, the way we approach the protest event data in the present manuscript). Those who find rather 
negative results tend to focus on the local level and cover both protests and more ‘conventional’ 
actions. In an important study, McCarthy et al. (2008) provided strong evidence in favour of the 
                                                          
1 To account for the fact that protests over some issues might be more likely to involve violence, while others are more 




stability of bias. Based on data for Minsk, the authors show that the patterns of selection bias are very 
stable even in a period of political transition. Unfortunately, identifying media attention cycles outside 
the newspaper coverage that such cycles are supposed to influence is difficult. McCarthy et al.’s (1996) 
seminal study on Washington D.C. is most often cited as showing the effects of such cycles. But 
although they observe media attention effects, these effects “are dwarfed by the consequences of size 
on media coverage” (McCarthy et al., 1996, p. 492). 
In terms of the cross-national comparability, the use of a single national paper “only works under 
the debatable assumption that each paper has roughly the same level of attention for the same kind of 
domestic protests” (Rucht and Neidhardt, 1998: 74). To minimize the effect of ‘news agency 
characteristics’, the present dataset is based on as comparable newspaper as possible. The newspapers 
were chosen with respect to six criteria: continuous publication throughout the research period, daily 
publication (on all days apart from Sunday), high quality, comparability regarding political orientation 
(none is very conservative or extremely left-wing), coverage of the entire national territory, and similar 
selectivity when reporting on protest events (see below). Again, the existing selection bias studies 
report relatively consistent findings across a diverse range of countries. This led McCarthy et al. (2008: 
142) conclude that the same selection logics “appear to extend cross-nationally.” 
To get one step further in this ongoing debate, we compared our data with data retrieved from an 
international news agency, as suggested by Rucht and Neidhardt (1998: 74). Comparing the data set 
used for the present study with Reuters-based data suggests that the six national newspapers are equally 
selective with respect to the coverage of protest events in general and new social movement issues in 
particular. More specifically, we compared our data set with the European protest and coercion data 
(EPCD) collected by Ron Francisco and his colleagues (http://web.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/index.html). 
Overall, we retrieve the same kind of cross-national variation relying on the two datasets (see Hutter 
2014a: 164). In addition, we performed a simple test proposed by Koopmans (1995) who argued, “If 
newspapers are equally sensitive to protest events, there should be no difference in the likelihood of 
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events of the same intensity being reported.” Thus, if the different newspapers are equally selective, 
events with the same number of participants should be as likely to be covered in all six countries. We 
performed this test for the period 1975 to 2005, and our results support Koopmans’ claim that the 
newspapers tend to be equally selective (results available upon request). 
Furthermore, it can be shown that the ‘minimalist’ strategy (relying on one national newspaper 
per country and Monday editions only) scores well for the analyses carried out here when compared to 
more encompassing strategies of data collection. For example, Barranco and Wisler (1999) found that 
about half of the public demonstrations in Swiss cities took place either on Saturday or Sunday, and 
tests with continuous time-series data collected from Germany and from the United States find similar 
patterns (see Giugni, 2004; Hutter 2014a; Koopmans, 1995). In general, the results show that the 
national ebbs and flows of protest mobilization are traced accurately with our sampling strategy. 
However, the problems associated with the ‘minimalist’ strategy become more severe when 
disaggregating the variables too far (for example, tracing the development of a specific type of 
environmental protest over time or looking at yearly changes in welfare-related protests is not very 
reasonable). Therefore, in our work, we opted for a middle-range aggregation level of issues and time. 
Furthermore, to account for the Monday and regional bias of our data, we cross-checked our results by 
weighing the weekend protests and by considering the regional bias of the national newspapers. As 
Rucht and Neidhardt (1998: 74) suggest, using “a national newspaper is certainly advisable when one 
seeks to cover protests in a whole country. It should be made clear, however, that a nationally 
published newspaper inherently tends to apply the criterion of ‘nationwide relevance’ for covering 
protests.” However, even national newspapers report on local issues, and events occurring close to a 
newspaper headquarter are more likely to be reported. To assess the regional bias of the papers, we 
compared the share of protest events that are reported to take place in these ‘favored’ regions with the 
share of people living there. Note that the bias towards ‘these’ favored regions and weekend protests 
does not affect the longitudinal and comparative results reported in this paper.  
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Appendix A2: The semi-automated protest event dataset (PEA-16) 
The protest event data has been jointly collected by the ERC project Political Conflict in Europe in the 
Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON) at the European University Institute and the Years of 
Turmoil (YoT) project at the University of Zurich. The dataset covers 30 European countries in the 
span of sixteen years (2000-2015). The countries covered by the dataset are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. Given that the 
argument in the present paper refers to the developments in Western European societies, we restrict the 
scope of our analysis to Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. We exclude from 
the analysis post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, as well as Finland, Iceland, Luxemburg, 
Malta, countries where our dataset captures very few protest events (N<100). In addition, we also 
exclude Northern Ireland, due to the high share of protests on regionalism concentrated in specific 
years, which is not in the focus of our analysis and distorts the national long-term trend in the United 
Kingdom. 
The original dataset consists of 30,000 protest events and it is based on semi-automated content 
analysis of 10 English speaking newswires2. The data was collected with the aim to capture broad 
national and regional patterns of protest politics. We got access to the relevant newswires from the 
Lexis Nexis data service by using a list of more than 40 key words that describe different protest 
                                                          
2 We include the following news agencies: AFP, AP, APA, BBC, BNS, CTK, DPA, MTI, PA, and PAP. Our goal was to 
include not only the major news agencies (AFP, DPA, PA) but also regional ones covering Eastern and Southern Europe 
more in depth. 
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actions in the search query. Still, we were left with an extremely large corpus of 5.2 million documents 
and, hence, we developed natural language processing (NLP) tools to pre-select the documents to be 
manually coded. First, we removed documents that were exact or near duplicates and used a meta-data 
filter that discarded documents not reporting about any of our countries of interest. Afterwards, we 
developed tools to attribute a probability score to each document, indicating whether this document 
actually reports about protest events. For this purpose, we combined two different classifiers (i.e. 
algorithms that identify documents or words as probably indicators of a protest event): a supervised 
document classifier that uses a bag-of-words approach and a supervised anchor classifier that uses 
event-mention detection tools. 
A detailed evaluation of these classifiers by Lorenzini et al. (2018) shows that the classifiers are 
reliable and, thus, we used them to calculate a single probability score for each document. This score 
shows the likelihood that both classifiers indicate that a document is relevant. Afterwards, we manually 
coded a sample of documents to establish the optimal threshold for the probability score above which 
we are confident that a document reports about protest without excluding too many relevant 
documents. In other words, we attempted to find the optimal level of the probability score, which 
would reduce the number of documents that are false positives and false negatives. In the end, we 
classified slightly more than 100,000 documents as relevant, thereby substantially reducing the number 
of documents for our analysis. 
Afterwards, we employed manual coding to retrieve information on all protest events in our 
selected countries and period. For this purpose, we used a simplified version of the protest event 
analysis (PEA) approach that was first established by Kriesi et al. (1995). An important advantage of 
the semi-automated process was that it significantly reduced the amount of time and resources required 
for coding protest events. By using the classifiers, we could provide coders with documents that were 
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more likely to report about protest event. In total only 22 percent of the documents that we submitted to 
coders were irrelevant (compared to 95 percent of documents from our entire corpus that are 
irrelevant). Tests to evaluate the content of the documents that we excluded from the analysis show that 
most of them do not contain any protest events. Moreover, when documents report protest events, these 
events have the same attributes as the events included in the sample. Thus, we are confident that the 
articles, which we coded manually, are a good representation of all articles published by the ten 
newswires. 
However, to implement PEA we still relied on an additional sampling strategy because the corpus 
of relevant documents remained too large to be coded manually. Therefore, we categorized countries 
into three group: for countries with a large sample of documents, we coded 25 percent of the relevant 
documents; for countries with an average number of documents, we coded 50 percent; and for small 
countries with only a few hundred news reports, we coded all the documents identified as relevant by 
our classifiers. Afterwards, coders were asked to identify all mentions of protest events in the 
documents. Our definition of a relevant protest event follows the approach adopted by Kriesi et al. 
(1995). That is, the coders did not rely on a theoretical definition of relevant protest actions, which 
might be conceptually precise but practically very difficult to implement. Instead, coders identified 
relevant events based on a detailed list of unconventional or non-institutionalized action forms. In 
addition to the demonstrative, confrontational, and violent actions covered by Kriesi et al., the new 
dataset also covers strikes and other forms of industrial action. As they are not included in the second 
dataset used for the present paper, we have excluded them from the analysis of the new dataset as well. 
Moreover, we believe there are good reasons to study more modular forms of protest, such as 
demonstrations, separately from industrial action.  
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Ultimately, our analysis is based on the following number of events coded for the sixteen 
countries (in descending order): 1,571 Spain; 1,516 Greece; 1,040 France; 986 Italy; 925 United 
Kingdom; 857 Germany; 308 Belgium; 306 Austria; 222 Ireland; 206 Cyprus; 205 Denmark; 202 
Portugal; 188 Sweden; 181 Switzerland; 113 the Netherlands; 111 Norway; 925 United Kingdom. 
The coders recorded the following variables for each event: date, location, action form, issue of 
the protest, the collective actors participating in or organizing the protest, and the number of 
participants. To measure the level of inter-coder agreement, we presented fourteen coders with the 
same 65 documents at different times during their coding. For the identification of the events – 
assessing whether two coders agree on the data, country, and action form of all the events that they 
identify in the same document – the averaged F1-score was 0.60 with a standard deviation of 0.06. For 
the identification of event attributes, the average Cohen’s Kappa varies by event attribute. It was 0.57 
(with a standard deviation of 0.13) for actors, 0.53 (with a standard deviation of 0.45) for issues and 
0.45 (with a standard deviation of 0.06) for the number of participants. These values show that our 
coders have a relatively high level of agreement given that values from 0.40 to 0.60 are commonly 
defined as fair to good. 
A more detailed evaluation of the data is provided by (Wüest and Lorenzini 2018). They compare 
the data with both other large-N datasets based on international sources (such as ICWES) and datasets 
based on national sources. While we cannot report the details here, we want to emphasize that they 





Appendix A3 Newspapers covered by the election campaign data 
Table A3.1: Newspapers in CSA data 
 Quality newspaper Tabloid newspaper 
Austria Die Presse Kronenzeitung 
Britain The Times The Sun 
France Le Monde Le Parisien 
Germany Süddeutsche Zeitung  Bild 
Netherlands NRC Handelsblad Algemeen Dagblad 




Appendix A.4 Additional graphs 
The following set of graphs contain also the yearly values of the data. As we emphasize the aggregation 
into larger time periods in our methods’ section and for presentational purposes, we only present the 
three-year moving in the main text of the paper. In addition, we present the graphs based on the PEA-6 
data excluding France from the analysis as we only have data for France for the period 1975 to 2005. 
However, as noted in the main text, the general conclusions for Northwestern Europe are not affected 




Figure 1: Level of protest mobilization related to new ‘cultural’ issues in NWE, 1975 to 2011 







Figure 2: Issue salience and positions in protest politics in NWE, 1975 to 2011 








Figure 4: Issue salience and positions in protest politics across regions, 2000 to 2015 (N=16) 




Figure 5: Electoral strength of challenger parties and protest politics in 16 Western European countries 
 
Note: Figure 5a shows the average vote share jointly received by Green and PRR parties and the share of protest 
events related to new ‘cultural’ issues in percent of all coded protests. Figure 5b shows the average vote share 
received by PPR parties only and the average position on new ‘cultural’ events in the protest arena (range -1 to 1). 
To show the strength of PRR claims, positive values indicate support for cultural conservatism/xenophobia. 
The figures show the average values for the period 2000 to 2015 (party classifications based on ParlGov dataset). 
The line shows the regression line across all countries (Pearson’s r = 0.58 for Figure 5a and -0.34 for Figure 5b). 
 
Data source: ParlGov & PEA-16 
